Abstract. Using the method of correspondence analysis, Tamminga obtains sound and complete natural deduction systems for all the unary and binary truth-functional extensions of Kleene's strong three-valued logic K3. In this paper, we extend Tamminga's result by presenting an original finite, sound and complete proof-searching technique for all the truth-functional binary extensions of K3.
Introduction and motivation
Taking their inspiration from modal correspondence theory [44, 59, 60] , Kooi and Tamminga [26] presented correspondence analysis for the unary and binary extensions of the three-valued logic of paradox LP [2, 42, 41] . Correspondence analysis allows one to immediately find inference rules for the unary and binary operators added to LP from their truth tables' entries. Let ⋆ be an arbitrary unary or binary operator added to LP and f ⋆ be its truth table. Then an inference scheme Π ⊢ φ is said to characterize an f ⋆ 's entry E iff the following condition holds: Π |= φ iff E is an f ⋆ 's entry. So, all f ⋆ 's entries are characterized by inference schemes. Moreover, these inference schemes are inference rules, in fact. If one adds them to a natural deduction system for LP, one obtains a sound and complete natural deduction system for LP extended by ⋆. Automated proof-searching for natural deduction systems for LP and its extensions is presented in [36] . In this paper, we will deal with the correspondence analysis for the extensions of Kleene's strong three-valued logic K 3 [25, 24] which was presented by Tamminga [55] . Based upon Tamminga's paper, we develop an original sound and complete proofsearching technique in the spirit of [10, 36] for the natural deduction systems for the binary extensions of K 3 .
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Natural deduction successfully overcame skepticism concerning its appropriateness to automated theorem-proving [13] . See, for example, [52, 20] . In the paper, we aren't going to outline the topic. However, we stress the following aspects concerning our motivation. First, the paper deals with automated proof-searching for Fitch-style natural deduction for strong Kleene logic, and, to the best of our knowledge, this is original. Strong Kleene logic is itself worth studying for modelling partial recursive predicates and reasoning in a situation with a lack of information (the third value is interpreted as 'intermediate' or 'unknown'). Second, there are arguments that favour a Jaśkowski-Fitch style of natural deduction to Gentzen style of natural deduction [17] . Both reasons make proof-searching for natural deduction in this logic an important task. Moreover, we go further by proposing an original proof-searching procedure not only for this logic but for its generalizations which include some prominent logics mentioned in the literature (see sections 1.3 and 1.4 further). And the correctness argument (finiteness, soundness, and completeness) for the proof-searching procedure in all of these logics is given in one go. Last, but not least, the importance of the logics in question being equipped with a correct proof-searching procedure lies within the paradigm by Dov Gabbay, which strongly suggests, roughly speaking, that if the same logic has two different proof-searching procedures, then it's not the same logic [14] .
The structure of this paper is as follows: in the rest of this section, we briefly introduce a semantics for K 3 (subsection 1.1), the notion of correspondence analysis (subsection 1.2), and discuss some of K 3 's notable binary extensions (subsections 1.3 and 1.4); in section 2, we consider natural deduction systems for K 3 and its binary extensions; in section 3, we present our proof-searching technique; in section 4, we show how it works, using some examples; in section 5, we prove its soundness, completeness and termination; in section 6, we discuss related work; and in section 7, we summarize our results.
Semantics of strong Kleene logic
Strong Kleene logic K 3 is built over a propositional language L which contains a set P = {p, q, r, s, p 1 , . . .} of propositional variables, left and right parentheses, negation (¬), disjunction (∨), and conjunction (∧). A set F of all L -formulas is defined in a standard way. A set V of truth values contains the following elements only: 1 (true), i (intermediate/unknown), 0 (false). 1 (true) is the designated value. A function f ⋆ is said to be a truth table f for an operator ⋆. 2 A valuation v is said to be a function from P to V . A valuation v on P is extended to a valuation on F as follows: 
The notion of correspondence analysis
Though the notion of an entry of a truth table seems to be obvious, let us clarify that an entry is neither a row nor a column in a truth table. In the truth tables above, an entry of a truth table for ⋆ is any cell containing a valuation of ⋆. For instance, the truth table for negation contains exactly three entries.
Note that since K 3 is not functionally complete, it is not the case that
We will use the following adaptation of Kooi and Tamminga's definitions 2.1 and 1 from [26] and [55] , respectively. Definition 2 (Single Entry Correspondence [26, 55] ). Let Π ∪ {φ} ⊆ L
• . Let x, y, z ∈ {0, i, 1}. Then the truth table entry f • (x, y) = z is characterized by an inference scheme Π ⊢ φ, if
Tamminga [55, Theorem 1] found inference schemes which characterize an f • 's all possible entries (see Theorem 1 in Section 2 below).
Implicational extensions of K 3
Recall that an • is an arbitrary binary truth-functional operator. In particular cases, an • may be an implication. So, in this section, we consider some notable examples of K 3 's implicational extensions.
Let us start with Heyting's implication (we denote it by → 1 ). It originally appeared in Heyting's logic G 3 that was studied by Heyting [19] , Gödel [15] , and Jaśkowski [21] . However, G 3 's negation is not the same as K 3 's one. Although G 3 is not an implicational extension of K 3 , Batens [5] presented a logic which is K 3 extended by Heyting's implication. Natural deduction for G 3 itself is presented in [34] .
Słupecki's implication → 2 was presented in [53] and [31] as an attempt to restore the deduction theorem to Łukasiewicz's Ł 3 [28] . K 3 that was extended by Słupecki's implication appeared untitled in Avron's paper [3] . Following Popov [38] , we call this logic PComp.
The abovementioned Ł 3 [28] is K 3 extended by Łukasiewicz's implication → 3 .
Although Rescher's logic [43] is not an implicational extension of K 3 , Rescher's → 4 can be added to K 3 as an implicational connective.
Bochvar's → 5 is an implication of his logic B 3 [8] . Note that → 5 is also an implication of Sette and Carnielli's weakly intuitionistic logic I 1 [46] (which is a dual of Sette's P 1 [45] ) and Popov's (and Marcos') I 2 [39, 29] (which, in turn, is a dual of Marcos' P 2 [29] ). Although none of the abovementioned logics containing → 5 is an implicational extension of K 3 , one may consider K 3 that was extended by → 5 .
All these implications are natural in the sense of Tomova [56] . Moreover, as follows from [56] , in the case of the only designated value 1, there are only 6 natural implications → i , 1 i 6. A natural deduction characterisation (via correspondence analysis) of natural logics can be found in [37] .
However, in [58, 57] Tomova presents an extended class of natural implications. In the case of the only designated value 1, this class contains implications → i , 1 i 8. Note that → 7 is an implication of Karpenko and Tomova's literal paralogic TK 2 [22] (TK 1 's implication is → 4 ). Moreover, → 8 is Sette's implication [45] .
Peirce's arrow and Sheffer's stroke as extensions of K 3
However, it is not the case that an • may be implication only. It may be either Peirce's arrow or Sheffer's stroke. In [50] , Shestakov introduced Peirce's arrow ↓ 1 for K 3 . Moreover, in [49] and [51] , Shestakov presented Peirce's arrows ↓ 2 and ↓ 3 for B 3 's internal and external connectives, respectively. In [30] , McKinsey introduced Sheffer's stroke for Ł 3 (⇓). 
Natural deduction systems
Natural deduction systems for K 3 were presented independently by Priest [41] and by Tamminga [55] . 3 Tamminga's system ND K 3 contains the following inference rules.
Elimination rules:
Introduction rules:
Although in [41, 55] a natural deduction derivation is defined in a tree-format, we will define it in a linear-format (sometimes referred to as Jaśkowski-Fitch style), following Copi, Cohen, and McMahon's textbook [11, p. 366 ].
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Definition 3. A derivation in ND K 3 of a formula ω from a set of assumptions Π is a finite nonempty sequence of formulae with the following conditions:
1. Each formula is an assumption or follows from the previous formulae via an ND K 3 -rule; 2. By applying (∨E) each formula starting from the assumption φ until a formula χ, inclusively, as well as each formula starting from the assumption ψ until a formula χ, inclusively, is discarded from the derivation.
A proof in ND K 3 is a derivation from the empty set of assumptions.
Note that although both a derivation and a proof cannot be empty, later we will show the way our proof-searching procedure deals with the 3 We follow Tamminga's formulation; however, the only difference between Tamminga's and Priest's calculi is with regard to the rule (EFQ). In Priest's version it is as follows: φ∧¬φ ψ . 4 See also [48] , where a precise definition of a derivation is discussed. situation when no derivation is found and, moreover, the sequence of formulae after proof-searching is empty (see Sections 3 and 4).
As follows from [41] and [55] , ND K 3 is sound and complete. To obtain a natural deduction system ND K • The i-rules 5 are considered to be elimination rules while the remaining ones are considered to be introduction rules.
is an extension of ND K 3 by the inference rules which are introduced in Theorem 1. Note that each of ND K 3 's extensions has one, and only one, rule from each of the nine groups of the inference rules. As follows from [55] , ND K • 3 is sound and complete.
Let us introduce an example of a derivation of ¬p from ¬q and p • q in some ND K • 3 with R • (i, 0, i) and R • (1, 0, i). [5] [6] [7] , [8] 3. Proof search for ND K3 and ND K •
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As far as we know, there is no published work concerning natural deduction proof search for K 3 . Here we adapt an algorithm for searching for natural deduction proofs in a variety of logics [9, 10] . Note that proof-searching is always carried out in a particular system. In searching for a proof, there are internal states of the algorithm: list − proof and list − goals. List − proof is a name of a (possibly empty) sequence of formulae (some of them being highlighted as discarded, following the 2 nd clause of Definition 3), and list − goals is a name of a nonempty sequence of goals, i.e. formulae we want to prove. 7 The result 5 By an x-rule we mean an •-rule with v(φ • ψ) = x. R•(0, 0, i) is an example of an i-rule. 6 Note that we obtain R•(i, 0, i) and R•(1, 0, i) from f•(i, 0) = i and f•(1, 0) = i, respectively. 7 As the reader will soon find out, the emptiness of list−proof is a specific feature of proof-searching for K3. A counterexample is extracted even from empty list−proof.
of proof-searching may be a proof or a counterexample. Below we describe in detail all the procedures to define an algo − derivation for ND K 3 and ND K •
(abbreviated through the paper as ALG K 3 and ALG K •
, respectively).
Given the task of finding an algo − derivation of α from Γ in some
, with Ω and Ξ being its list − proof and list − goals, respectively, we will use the following notation. 'Ω ⊢ Ξ' is to mean that at the current state of proof-searching Ω denotes list − proof and Ξ denotes list − goals. If we want to highlight that a formula ψ is a member of Ω / a goal ψ is a member of Ξ we write '
If we want to highlight that a goal ψ is the last member of Ξ we write 'Ω ⊢ Ξ 1 , ψ'.
Current − goal ψ is reached in the following situations: (1) ψ is in list − goals and list − proof ; (2) some formula and its negation are in list − proof. In the case of (2) current − goal ψ is reached via (EFQ).
as an input and outputs with 'Ω 1 ⊢ Ξ 1 '. This definition captures the idea that at some point during a proof search the current state is 'Ω ⊢ Ξ' and some time later it is 'Ω 1 ⊢ Ξ 1 '. Procedure 1 (Pr1). Pr1 governs the applicability of the elimination rules. Pr1 marks both its premise(s) and a conclusion to prevent the reapplicability of the same elimination rule to the same formula. On the other hand, reapplicability of the same elimination rule to the same formula becomes possible, if the conclusion of the previous application of the elimination rule is discarded from list − proof.
Procedure 2 (Pr2). Pr2 governs the reachability of current − goal. Pr2 subsequently checks whether list − proof has current − goal as a nondiscarded formula and (if not) checks whether list − proof has some formula and its negation, both being non-discarded. Pr3.1.1. If Ω ⊢ Ξ, φ ∧ ψ and φ ∧ ψ isn't a member of Ω, then Ω ⊢ Ξ, φ ∧ ψ, φ and afterwards Ω, φ ⊢ Ξ, φ ∧ ψ, ψ (a proof of a conjunctive goal is searched via searching for proofs of its conjuncts starting from the left one).
(a proof of a disjunctive goal is searched via searching for proofs of its disjuncts starting from the left one).
, ¬φ ∧ ¬ψ (proof-searching for ¬φ ∧ ¬ψ guides us to proof-searching for ¬(φ ∨ ψ)).
Pr3.1.5. If Ω ⊢ Ξ, ¬¬φ and ¬¬φ isn't a member of Ω, then Ω ⊢ Ξ, ¬¬φ, φ (proof-searching for φ guides us to proof-searching for ¬¬φ).
Pr3.1.6-Pr.3.1.7 govern the cases with φ • ψ or ¬(φ • ψ) being current − goal. The way we treat them depends solely on •-rules the particular system has.
The general idea is that only the 1-rules of the system in question (if any) are responsible for searching for current − goal φ • ψ and only the 9 A literal is standardly defined to be a propositional variable or its negation. 10 Note that the difference between Pr3.1.1 and Pr3.1.2. In the former procedure, the left conjunct is reached if and only if we start out searching for the right one. In the latter procedure, the left disjunct is reached if and only if we don't start out searching for the right one. In more detail, if the left disjunct is reached, then we don't start out searching for the right one because a disjunctive goal is reachable via (∨I1). Conversely, if we don't start out searching for the right disjunct, then it means we have already reached the left one and, therefore, a disjunctive goal is reached via (∨I1). Additionally, in the case of Pr3.1.2 we delete all the formulae and goals to have been added to an algo-derivation while searching for the left disjunct. It should be noted that 'deleted' means something considerably different than 'discarded'. For example, discarded formulae are one of the essential parts of a derivation while, having been one of the essential parts of proof-searching, deleted formulae are not parts of a derivation at all. 0-rules of the system in question (if any) are responsible for searching for current − goal ¬(φ • ψ). For the considerations concerning the 0-rules are similar to the ones concerning the 1-rules we confine ourselves to the 1-rules.
Among the 1-rules, the easiest rule to apply is R • (i, i, 1): it has no premises. If it is in the system and current
11 This formula in list − proof is helpful in searching for φ • ψ.
Then it is easier to apply a 1-rule, if its premise is a conjunct of some conjunctive formula and not a conjunctive formula itself. Thus the next ones to apply are the rules
We consider R • (0, i, 1). The others are considered similarly. If
The hardest 1-rules to apply are 1, 1 ) for their premises are conjunctive formulas. We consider R • (0, 0, 1). The others are considered similarly. If R • (0, 0, 1) is in the system, current − goal is φ • ψ and ¬φ ∧ ¬ψ is in list − proof, then φ • ψ is readily reached. We thank one of the referees for the following generalisation for these procedures: "if a rule R is in the system, current − goal is φ • ψ and all formulas from the left-hand side of |= in R occur in list − proof, then we also have everything that occurs on the right-hand side of |= in R in list − proof ". We, however, strongly believe that a more detailed description makes understanding easier.
So, this is the fixed order in applying the 1-rules in searching for current − goal φ • ψ. 13 We try to saturate list − proof with (negations) of subformulae of φ • ψ.
φ (a proof of φ • ψ is searched for via searching for the applicability of one of the rules 
is searched via searching for applicability one of the rules (1, 1, 0) ).
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Procedure 3.2. Pr3.2 governs current − goal depending on the type of formulae in list − proof. Below Pr3.2.1-Pr3.2.2 provide a detailed description. As in Pr1, Pr3.2 prevents reapplicability with marks. First, Pr3.2 doesn't apply to the formulae which are marked by Pr1. Second, Pr3.2 marks the reapplicability of the same rule to the same formula. However, it allows the applicability of two (three etc.) rules to the same formula. On the other hand, the reapplicability of Pr3.2 to the same formula becomes possible, if the result of its application is discarded from list − proof. 
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The general idea is to use φ • ψ and ¬(φ • ψ) from list − proof in order to reach current − goal. Here the i-rules come into play. As in the case of the 1-rules and the 0-rules in Pr3.1, the i-rules are ordered by the ease of applicability. Since the considerations concerning φ • ψ from list − proof are similar to the ones concerning ¬(φ • ψ) from list − proof we confine ourselves to φ • ψ from list − proof.
Among the i-rules, the easiest rule to apply is R • (i, i, i): it has one premise. If it is in the system and φ • ψ is in list − proof, then list − goals updates with the following goals:
is readily reached too. This formula in list − proof is helpful in searching for any current − goal.
Then it is easier to apply an i-rule, if one of its two premises is a conjunct of some conjunctive formula and not the conjunctive formula itself. Thus the next ones to apply are the rules So, this is the order in applying the i-rules in searching for current − goal. Again, we try to saturate list − proof with (negations) of sub-
In what follows,
Procedure 4. Pr4 governs the applicability of the introduction rules. It is strictly determined by and following Pr3.1 that list − proof is updated via an introduction rule. For example, Pr3.1.1 is formulated so that when both φ and ψ are in list − proof, φ ∧ ψ is in list − proof via (∧I), either. As both Pr1 and Pr3, Pr4 prevents reapplicability with marks. Pr4 marks reapplicability to the same formula. On the other hand, the reapplicability of Pr4 to the same formula becomes possible, if the result of its application is discarded from list − proof. The specifics of the marking mechanism of Pr4 amount to the fact that results of its application are marked to prevent the applicability of both Pr1 and Pr3.
Proof-searching algorithm ALG K •

3
A description of the proof-searching algorithm ALG K • 3 is as follows. A flowchart of the algorithm one can find in Figure 1 on page 15.
1:
Step 1. Input a task to find an algo-derivation of α from Γ . 2: Goto step 2. 3:
Step 2. Pr2 is launched. 4: The algorithm checks if current − goal is reached. 5: if yes then 6: goto step 3. 7: else goto step 4. 8: end if 9: Step 3. The algorithm checks if current − goal is initial − goal. 10: if yes then
Step 1
Step 2
Stop
Step 3
Step 4
Step 5 an algo-derivation of α from Γ is found. Stop. 12: else Pr4 is launched. Goto step 2. 13: end if 14: Step 4. The algorithm checks if any elimination rule is applicable. 15 
Algo-Proof Examples
As an example, we consider an algo-proof of ¬p from ¬q and p • q in some system with the following i-rules only: 
is derived in list − proof by thus making (p ∨ ¬p) ∨ (q ∨ ¬q) reached. Formally, we have
is the only unmarked formula in list − proof, so Pr3.2.1 applies to it. The algorithm tries to derive current − goal ¬p from, first, the assumption p ∨ ¬p and then from the assumption q ∨ ¬q. By applying Pr3.2.1 to the assumption p ∨ ¬p the algorithm tries to derive current − goal ¬p from, first, the assumption p and then from the assumption ¬p. Formally, we have 
(∨E): 9, 8, 5 [9] , [6] [7] [8] The algorithm tries to derive current − goal ¬p from the assumption q ∨¬q. By applying Pr3.2.1 to the assumption q ∨¬q, the algorithm tries to derive current − goal ¬p from, first, the assumption q and then from the assumption ¬q. In the first case, current − goal is reached, by Pr4 and via (EFQ), for both q and ¬q are in list − proof. Then the algorithm tries to derive current − goal ¬p from the assumption ¬q. p ∨ ¬p is unmarked in list − proof and Pr3.2.1 applies to it. Now the algorithm, again, tries to derive current − goal ¬p from, first, the assumption p and then from the assumption ¬p. Formally, we have .
list − goals: p Pr1 isn't applicable for list − proof is empty. By Pr2, p isn't reached for neither p is in list − proof nor list − proof contains some formula and its negation. By P3.1.2, p is deleted from list − goals and ¬p is set to be current − goal. Again, Pr1 isn't applicable for list − proof is empty. By Pr2, ¬p isn't reached for neither is ¬p in list − proof nor does list − proof contain some formula and its negation.
Note that list − proof is still empty.
At this moment, no procedures are applicable. A counterexample is extracted from empty list − proof with p ∈ Σ and ¬p ∈ Σ. Thus,
As another example, we consider an algo-proof of p • q from ¬p ∧ q in some system with the following 1-rules only: R • (1, 1, 1) and R • (0, i, 1) . R • (0, 1, 0) is a rule of the system as well.
Initial − goal p • q and a formula ¬p ∧ q are added to list − goals and list − proof, respectively. Pr1 (applicability of the elimination rules) applies to ¬φ ∧ ψ in order to derive ¬p and q via (∧E 1 ) and (∧E 2 ). P1 isn't applicable, and current − goal isn't reached. So we proceed with Pr3.1 (analysis of current − goal p•q). The order in Pr3.1.6 says Pr3.1.6.2 (dealing with R • (0, i, 1)) applies before Pr3.1.6.3 (dealing with R • (1, 1, 1) ). So, (p ∨ ¬q) ∨ (p • q) is set to be the current − goal. Formally, we have
Pr3.1.2 applies to current − goal resulting in p•q and then q ∨¬q being added to list − goals with q ∨ ¬q being current − goal. Pr3.1.2 applies to it and sets q as current − goal. By Pr2 (reachability of current − goal), q is reached. Hence, by Pr4 (applicability of the introduction rules), q ∨ ¬q and then (q ∨ ¬q) ∨ (p • q) are derived in list − proof via two applications of (∨I 1 ). Now p • q is current − goal, again. Formally, we have
Note that both q ∨ ¬q and (q ∨ ¬q) ∨ (p • q) are marked to prevent applications of Pr3.2.1 (updatability of list − proof and list − goals) to them. No procedures are applicable; however, we don't stop for the system has R • (1, 1, 1) . Hence, we delete all the formulae from list − proof and list − goals, which have been added by Pr3.1.6.2, and launch Pr3.1.6.3. Formally, we have
p ∧ q is set to be current − goal. Pr3.1.1 applies to it resulting in p and then q being added to list − goals with q being current − goal. q is reached, so p is set to be current − goal. Formally, we have
At this moment we stop for no procedures of the algorithm are applicable with p ∈ Σ, ¬p ∈ Σ, q ∈ Σ and ¬q ∈ Σ. The following counterexample is extractable: ξ(p) = 0, ξ(q) = 1, ξ(¬p ∧ q) = 1, and ξ(p • q) = 0.
Termination, soundness, and completeness
Theorem 2 (Termination of the algorithm). The algorithm halts on any input.
Theorem 2 follows from two lemmata. Lemma 3 shows each procedure of the algorithm is finite. Lemma 4 shows no infinite loop is possible.
Lemma 3. Each procedure of the algorithm is finite.
Proof. We need a standard definition of the degree of a formula ω, g(ω), as the number of connectives in ω. Without loss of generality, we say g(P ) = g(¬P ) = 0, for each propositional variable P .
We start out by showing the finiteness of Pr3.1, which is a part of Pr3 and governs an analysis of current − goal. With regard to Pr3.1.1-Pr3.1.5, any application of these procedures decreases, directly or indirectly, the degree of current − goal.
For example, Pr3.1.1 does it directly for g(φ) < g(φ ∧ ψ) and g(ψ) < g(φ ∧ ψ). Pr3.1.4 does it indirectly. First, it applies to ¬(φ ∨ ψ) to obtain current − goal ¬φ ∧ ¬ψ. Second, Pr3.1.1 applies to ¬φ ∧ ¬ψ with g(¬φ) < g(¬(φ ∨ ψ)) and g(¬ψ) < g (¬(φ ∨ ψ) ). The reader might readily check that the same thing holds for Pr3.1.6-Pr3.1.7. By induction on a degree of current − goal, it can be shown that within a finite number of applications of Pr3.1 to current − goal the algorithm stops by obtaining a literal as current − goal.
The finiteness of Pr3.1 implies the finiteness of Pr4, which governs applications of the introduction rules. Note that the marking mechanism prevents reapplication of an introduction rule unless the result of this application is discarded from list − proof.
To show the finiteness of Pr1, which governs applications of the elimination rules, let's consider the following.
First, the number of assumptions in Γ is finite. Second, due to the finiteness of Pr3.1, a number of assumptions added to list − proof via Pr3.1 is finite.
Third, it can be shown in the same manner as in the case of Pr3.1 that in any application of Pr1 (except (∨E), (¬∧E), 0, i) , and R • (1, 1, i) ), the degree of a conclusion is less than a degree of (some of) its premise(s).
With regard to (¬∧E) and R • (i, i, i), they are reducible to the case of (∨E).
With regard to (∨E),
, and R • (1, 1, i), let's recall that an arbitrary formula χ, which is the conclusion of these rules, is current − goal (see Pr3.2). By induction, it can be shown that there can be a finite number of applications of Pr1 to a finite number of both assumptions from Γ and assumptions added to list − proof via Pr3.1. Note that the marking mechanism prevents the reapplication of an elimination rule unless the result of this application is discarded from list − proof.
The finiteness of Pr1 implies the finiteness of Pr2, which governs reachability of current − goal: it is a finite process to check, if a finite list − proof contains current − goal and/or some formula and its negation.
Finally, the finiteness of both Pr1 and the number of assumptions implies the finiteness of Pr3.2, which governs current − goal depending on the type of formulae in list − proof. The same argument concerning Pr3.1 applies to Pr3.2. For example, by 3.2.1, if φ ∨ ψ is in list − proof, then φ is in list − proof or ψ is in list − proof with g(φ) < g(φ ∨ ψ) and g(ψ) < g (φ∨ψ) . By induction, it can be shown that there can be a finite number of applications of Pr3.2 to a finite list − proof. Note that the marking mechanism prevents the reapplication of Pr3.2 to the same formula unless the result of this application is discarded from list − proof. ⊣ Proof. According to the description of the algorithm, the following loops are possible. Loop 1: Step2 ∞ Step3. On
Step 2, the algorithm checks the reachability of current − goal. If current − goal is reached, then the algorithm checks whether current − goal is initial − goal. If it's not, then, by Pr4, which governs applications of introduction rules, current − goal is deleted from list − goals and the preceding goal is set to be current − goal. Then the algorithm returns to
Step 2 to check whether new current − goal is initial − goal. Due to the finiteness of Pr3.1, which governs an analysis of current − goal, list − goals is finite. Thus, the algorithm subsequently checks each goal in list − goals down initial − goal. It implies Loop 1 is impossible.
Loop 2: Step2 ∞ Step4. On
Step 2, the algorithm checks the reachability of current − goal. If current − goal isn't reached, then, by Pr1, which governs applications of elimination rules, all possible elimination rules are applied in list − proof. Due to the finiteness of Pr1, this process stops and the algorithm returns to Step 2 to check whether current − goal is reached in an updated list − proof. If current − goal isn't reached, again, then Pr1 isn't applicable, and the algorithm goes to Step 5. It implies Loop 2 is impossible.
Loop 3: Step2 ∞ Step5. On
Step 2, the algorithm checks the reachability of current − goal. If current − goal isn't reached, then the algorithm goes to Step 4. By the previous argument, it's possible for the algorithm to go to Step 5. On this Step, the algorithm checks whether Pr3.1, which governs an analysis of current − goal, is applicable to current − goal. If it is, new current − goal is set and the algorithm returns to Step 2 to check whether new current − goal is reached. Due to the finiteness of Pr3.1, the algorithm subsequently comes down to a literal being current − goal. For Pr3.1 isn't applicable to a literal the algorithm goes to Step 6. It implies Loop 3 is impossible.
Loop 4: Step2 ∞ Step6. On Step 2, the algorithm checks the reachability of current − goal. If current − goal isn't reached, then the algorithm goes to Step 4. By the penultimate argument, it's possible for the algorithm to go to Step 5. By the ultimate argument, it's possible for the algorithm to go to Step 6. On this step, the algorithm checks whether Pr3.2 which governs current − goal depending on the type of formulae in list − proof, is applicable. If it's applicable, then the algorithm sets new current − goal, marks the formula from list − proof to which Pr3.2 is applied and returns to Step 2. Due to the finiteness of both Pr3.2 and list − proof, the algorithm subsequently comes down to the situation, where each formula in list − proof is a literal or is marked. Since Pr3.2 isn't applicable to a literal, so the algorithm goes to a counterexample extraction. It implies Loop 4 is impossible. ⊣ 4.7. φ ∈ Σ, ¬φ ∈ Σ, ψ ∈ Σ, ¬ψ ∈ Σ; 4.8. φ ∈ Σ, ¬φ ∈ Σ, ψ ∈ Σ, ¬ψ ∈ Σ; 4.9. φ ∈ Σ, ¬φ ∈ Σ, ψ ∈ Σ, ¬ψ ∈ Σ. First, we consider one of the four outputs, where two literals belong to Σ, say, 4.1; the others are similar. Note that we always search for an algo-proof in a particular system.
Suppose the system we are looking for an algo-proof in has R • (1, 1, 1 ). By Pr3.1.6.3, φ ∧ ψ ∈ Σ, that contradicts Condition that φ • ψ ∈ Σ. Therefore, R • (1, 1, 1 ) isn't a rule of the system in this output. So, if
Second, we consider one of the four outputs, where only one of the literals belongs to Σ, say, 4.3; the others are similar.
Suppose the system we are looking for an algo-proof in has R • (1, i, 1). Third, we consider 4.9, the only output, where no literal belongs to Σ.
Suppose the system we are looking for a proof in has R • (i, i, 1). By Pr3.1.6.1, (φ ∨ ¬φ) ∨ (ψ ∨ ¬ψ) ∨ (φ • ψ) ∈ Σ. By Pr3.2.1, φ ∈ Σ or ¬φ ∈ Σ or ψ ∈ Σ or ¬ψ ∈ Σ or φ • ψ ∈ Σ. The latter variant contradicts Condition while the four former ones contradict Condition of output 4.9. Therefore, R • (i, i, 1) isn't a rule of the system in this
We treat it analogously to Case 4. Second, we show that ξ(Σ) = 1, that is, a set Σ is a model set. The number of cases depends on the type of a formula in Σ.
Case 0: for any formula φ, it is not the case that φ ∈ Σ and ¬φ ∈ Σ.
Suppose both φ and ¬φ belong to Σ. By Pr2 and Pr4, α is derived, which contradicts Condition.
Case 1: If ¬¬φ ∈ Σ, then φ ∈ Σ and ¬φ ∈ Σ. If ¬¬φ ∈ Σ, then φ ∈ Σ, by Pr1. If ¬φ ∈ Σ, then, by Pr2 and Pr4, α is derived that contradicts Condition. So, we have φ ∈ Σ and ¬φ ∈ Σ. Therefore, ξ(φ) = ξ(¬¬φ) = 1. Case (4.1.1.2), where φ ∈ Σ, is treated symmetrically. So is case (4.1.2), where ¬ψ ∈ Σ. Now we finish considering case (4.1), where the system has R • (0, 0, 0). 
The latter output contradicts Condition.
The output φ ∈ Σ is treated above. The remaining ones are treated analogously.
The system has
We treat each of them as in (4.3.1).
4.3.3. The system has R • (i, i, 1). By Pr3.1.
The latter output takes a little bit more detail; the others are treated above.
If φ • ψ ∈ Σ, then we consider the other eight clusters, depending on the rules of corresponding analysis in the system in question. In this way, we either derive one of the literals φ, ψ (i.e. φ ∈ Σ or ¬φ ∈ Σ or ψ ∈ Σ or ¬ψ ∈ Σ) or we don't derive any of the literals φ, ψ (i.e. φ ∈ Σ and ¬φ ∈ Σ and ψ ∈ Σ and ¬ψ ∈ Σ).
The outputs φ ∈ Σ or ¬φ ∈ Σ or ψ ∈ Σ or ¬ψ ∈ Σ are treated above. With regard to the output φ ∈ Σ and ¬φ ∈ Σ and ψ ∈ Σ and ¬ψ ∈ Σ, we have ξ(φ) = ξ(ψ) = i and ξ(φ • ψ) = 1. Now we finish treating the (0, 0)-cluster, which is a part of group 1. Group 2 and 3 are treated similarly. Now a proof of Case 4 is complete. The contraposition of Lemma 6 yields us a proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 7 (Completeness of the algorithm). The algorithm is complete.
Related work
We begin by stressing the fact that both analytic tableaux and resolution are out of our scope due to their well-known worst-case complexity. To put it differently, these proof systems have so-called hard examples. In particular, M. D'Agostino [12] proves that analytic tableaux has factorial complexity and A. Haken [16] proves exponential complexity for resolution. This is the reason we don't discuss provers based upon these proof systems (see, for example, [6, 23] ).
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We, also, note that it's still an open problem whether Hilbert-style calculus, sequent-style calculus with cut, and natural deduction calculus have hard examples. In addition, we avoid an influential paradigm, according to which a proof search is carried out in some proof system and then its result is transformed into natural deduction proofs [1] .
On the other hand, our extensions of strong Kleene logic are limited to the 3-valued case. Therefore, in the paper we discuss neither some special case with n 4 (for example, n = 16 as in [54] ), nor the general n-valued case as in [18] . We consider these to be topics for future work (Automated) proof-searching for (Jaśkowski-Fitch style) natural deduction has been the focus of much fruitful research since the nineties. Without pretending to give a full outline, let's us mention the following provers for classical logic: THINKER by J. Pelletier [32] , OSCAR by J. Pollock [35] , ANDP by D. Li [27] , CMU PT by W. Sieg and J. Byrnes [47] , and Symlog by F. Portoraro [40] . Some of them have been extended to non-classical logics and/or are accompanied with metatheoretical arguments (soundness and completeness). We note that none of them deals with the logics to have been studied in this paper and none of them provides a one-go proof-searching account (accompanied with a metatheory) for such a number of logics.
With regard to implementation, we highlight the fact that the general feature of our approach is that we propose a wide open platform for possible implementations. It's clear that the proof-searching procedure presented in the paper needs auxiliary and specific subprocedures, if one wants to implement them for a particular logic or logics. Some derivable rules will definitely make proof-searching more effective and easier. So, these new rules will need original proof-searching procedures. With regard to first-order variants, we note that the presented proofsearching procedure has a classical first-order extension [7] . And we believe both implementation and first-order extensions for the presented logics will be a part of future research.
Conclusion
In the paper, we have presented an original finite, sound, and complete proof-searching algorithm for all the natural deduction systems for the binary extensions of strong Kleene logic. We leave for future work the task of providing the similar work for all the unary truth-functional extensions of strong Kleene logic to have been presented by Tamminga [55] . The study of complexity and proof-searching procedures for the given natural deduction systems are another points of future research.
